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Abstract—Dynamic and flexible radio resource management
in a multi-tenant shared infrastructure is an effective strategy
to improve the quality experienced by end users. In this frame-
work, we propose a techno-economic model that allows network
operators to compete and dynamically select the quality target
to deliver to their customers, while simultaneously maximizing
the profit. In order to understand the willingness of the network
operators in the engagement on a sharing scenario, we develop
a non-cooperative game wherein the Nash Equilibria show the
disposition of operators to meet the customers’ requirements.
At the same time, the proposed framework show how it is
challenging the definition of a new business market when scarcity
of resources is assumed.
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of new technologies and their applications
have caused a huge growth in mobile data traffic [1]. Mo-
bile Network Operators (MNOs) are faced with tackling this
growth, resulting in an increase in their operating expendi-
ture (OpEx) and capital expenditure (CapEx). Data revenues,
however, are not keeping pace with the traffic increase [2]
and MNOs, therefore, need to redefine their business modus
operandi: inevitably, cost reduction remains the main driver for
profitability. Infrastructure sharing, according to the Organi-
zation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
promises to provide an opportunity to cope with the more
stringent requirements of future networks (5G and beyond)
while reducing the total expenditure [3].
Many studies analyze the validity and the advantages of
several sharing options, focusing either on the economical ben-
efits [4], [5], [6], or on the strategic modeling of infrastructure
[7], [8]. One of the main concerns while considering sharing
options is coping with the tradeoff between the cost savings
and the level of operational autonomy of MNOs [9].
Active sharing, which entails sharing radio access network
resources including the spectrum, is the most comprehensive
of the sharing methods and allows a significant reduction in
costs when compared to passive sharing – as reported by the
OECD report [3, Pg. 65]. However, active sharing implies
some kind of control on how resources are shared. A popular
approach to controlling shared resources is the use of Service
Level Agreements (SLAs). Today’s SLAs, however, are rather
long term and do not help the MNOs cope with short term fluc-
tuations in the traffic their networks carry. Thereby, resulting in
scenarios where the MNOs either posses a surfeit of resources
or a lack thereof. Therefore, active sharing has to be based on
a more dynamic and flexible methodology, wherein MNOs can
trade the amount of resources needed to meet their customers’
demands in real-time. A first step in this direction was taken
in [10], where the authors propose a techno-economic model
that allows dynamic (short term) pricing and allocation of
network resources. Their model is based on a comprehensive
sharing scenario in which multiple Mobile Virtual Network
Operators (MVNOs) lease or rent the infrastructure from
an Infrastructure Provider (InP). The dynamism their model
permits is due to its ability to allow deviations (from an
initial long term SLA) depending on the MVNOs individual
budgets as well as their traffic load. However, though [10]
incorporates fluctuations in traffic and the MVNOs’ budgets,
it neither explicitly considers the quality of services provided
to the users while modeling fluctuations in traffic nor analyzes
the profitability of the MVNOs. These aspects are precisely
what this paper addresses: we provide a method to translate
the users’ willingness to pay and the quality targets of the
MVNOs into time-varying resource requirements, which are
in turn used by the InP while allocating network resources to
the MVNOs. It is important to note that the use of long term
SLAs is no longer necessary in the model we propose. This
allows the MVNOs to focus on meeting the quality assurances
they make to their users rather than on the amount of resources
they require. This work explores the aforementioned trade-offs
with the use of game theory. Despite many works try to justify
the use of a game theoretic approach for infrastructure sharing,
most of them only focus on the beneficial effects of the
sharing. Authors in [11] and [12] investigate the cost reduction
if MVNOs cooperate in taking common decisions on network
deployment. [13] analyzes also the technical advantages in
terms of throughput and how to guarantee fairness solutions
in the game. However, none of these works highlights the
necessity to define a new business system, wherein MVNOs
can even take autonomous decisions, addressing the need of
differentiation policies among MVNOs [14]. This is another
contribute that this paper tries to provide.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section II we describe
the considered scenario and the main features involved. In
Section III we present the approach and the algorithm for
determining a solution of the game. Then, in Section IV
the achieved results are shown, and, finally, our remarks will
conclude the paper in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a multi-agent scenario, where a single infras-
tructure provider interacts with competitive MVNOs that have
to deliver data traffic to end users. We denote the set of the
MVNOs by M , and let K be the set of the active users in
the network; then, let Km ⊂ K be the set of the users of the
MVNO m. We consider the downlink in a single base station
scenario wherein the decisions taken by the base station’s
scheduler are not directly affected by those in the neighboring
base stations.
Let Uth be the intended utility (in terms of spectral ef-
ficiency [bps/Hz]) of a generic user for a specific service
requested and assume that all users in the area will require
the same type of data service. Given this assumption, we
can estimate the Market Share (MS) of an MVNO as the





We assume that MVNOs set their respective quality targets,
Uth,m, as a product of the intended utility Uth and a quality
of service parameter Qm, i.e. Uth,m = Uth ·Qm: this quality
parameter will set the fraction of utility that the MVNO m
has to provide to its users w.r.t. the one they require. The
utility achieved by a user k at time n is defined as a function
of the maximum achievable rate, rk[n], and the number of
assigned resources, xk[n], i.e. Uk (xk[n], rk[n]). Assuming a
partitioning of time in to elementary slots of duration 1 ms,
the scheduler decides to allocate a portion of the total wireless
resource, xk[n] ≥ 0, at time slot n to the user k. This
assignment will depend on the service requested by the user
and on the quality target that MVNOs set for the service. The
average utility achieved for all the users of a given MVNO m








Uk (xk[n], rk[n]) . (2)
Then, we model the quality experienced by a user by
combining the achieved utility1 Uk and the tariff imposed by
an MVNO. As in [15], we define the acceptance probability
as the probability that a user k will accept a price p, given the
achieved utility, Uk as:
A (p, Uk) = 1− exp(−Cp−Uµk ), (3)
where C is a normalization factor, and  and µ are micro-
economic parameters. With this, the MVNOs can estimate the
expected return on investment as well as the profit.
Finally, we assume the existence of a single InP who is not
subject to conventional market pressures. This, in turn, allows
setting a fixed price per unit of resource by ignoring market
driven fluctuations arising from competition between different
1Note that the explicit functional dependence described above has been
dropped in the interest of notational brevity.
infrastructure providers. We denote by Cop, the operating ex-
penditure (OpEx), and Ccap, the capital expenditure (CapEx).
III. FORMULATION AND ANALYSIS
As described in the previous section, the decisions that have
to be taken in the considered system are mainly two. On one
hand, the InP has to decide how to allocate the resources
among the MVNOs in order to maximize fairness. On the other
hand, the MVNOs have to decide how to select the quality
parameter Qm so that their own profit is maximized. While
the first one is an optimization model, the second one must
include the competitive behavior of the MVNOs. Therefore, in
this section, we first introduce the optimal resource allocation
model and then the competitive quality selection game.
A. Optimal resource allocation model
Based on the notations defined in Section II, the generic
optimization problem at a base station’s scheduler can be





xk[n] ≤ 1, ∀n ∈ N, (4b)
Uach,m ≤ Uth,m ∀m ∈M, (4c)
α ≤ Uach,m
Uth,m
, ∀m ∈M. (4d)
Unlike [16], we assume no pre-agreement among the parties
on how to share resources (e.g., in terms of service level
agreement) and, therefore, introduce a fairness parameter α.
The constraint (4b) ensures that the total number of re-
sources assigned is always less than or equal to the total
number of resources available in the network. The constraint
(4c) guarantees that the InP does not assign more resources to
MVNOs than their requested quality targets, because MVNOs
do not want to pay for something they did not ask for.
Finally, equation (4d) is the proportional fairness condition:
each operator will get the same proportion of the utility target
(equal to α), independent of the number of users and the
quality factor selected. Since the goal of the InP is to maximize
the parameter α in (4a), it guarantees fairness among MVNOs.
At the same time, the scheduler of a base station is still free to
select the best users in order to efficiently allocate resources.
Therefore, the proposed formulation indirectly maximizes the
minimum average utility of each MVNO.
This allocation scheme can lead to competition among the
MVNOs for the selection of the quality parameter. Observing
equation (4d), we see that MVNOs with higher utility targets
and/or larger number of users will need more resources to
achieve their targets. Given a shared scenario, this will also
affect the quality target of the other MVNOs. Then, MVNOs
need to optimize the decisions while trading off the service
quality experienced by their users with the total cost of the
infrastructure required.
B. Competitive quality selection game
We model competition among MVNOs as a non-cooperative
game, where the space of players is defined by M . As a
strategy, each player can select one among the possible values
of the quality parameter Qm ∈ {0, 0.1, . . . , 1}. We assume
that the space of all the possible permutations of strategies of
the players is the cartesian product of the single strategies of
the MVNOs, and denote it by
S = {(q1, q2, . . . , qn) : q1, q2, . . . , qn ∈ Qm},
where the n-tuple of strategies is defined for M =
{1, 2, . . . , n}. For each strategy s ∈ S, the infrastructure
provider generates a different allocation denoted by xk,s[n],
and a given user will get a strategy dependent utility denoted
by Uk,s (xk,s[n], rk[n]), depending on the decision taken by
the base station scheduler. The objective of the MVNOs is to
maximize a profit function, defined as the difference between
the payments made by its users, i.e. reward function Rm,s,
and the total expenditures, i.e. Bm,s, as
fm,s (p) = Rm,s (p)−Bm,s. (5)
1) Cost function: The InP fixes a price for a unit of
resource. Hence, we can define the cost for resources usage
Cm,s =
1






which represents the total amount spent by the m-th MVNO
for the resources used in a cell given the strategy s.
If the amount of resources available are insufficient to
satisfy the utility of each MVNO (i.e., the achieved utility
of the MVNOs will be a fraction of the desired threshold –
α < 1 ), the InP can introduce another component of the cost
to incentivize the MVNOs to help expand the capacity of the
network. We call this pressure cost [10], and it corresponds to
the total investment necessary for satisfying the targets of all
MVNOs. α being a measure of the utility achieved with the
available resources, we can assume that the amount of extra
resources needed can be evaluated as 1−αα . Hence, the pressure




· (Cop + Ccap) · λ, (7)
where the same price for a unit of resource (in terms of OpEx
and CapEx) is assumed, but is scaled by a factor λ > 1
representing the return on investment for the InP. From the
InP point of view, this is the total amount of money the
MVNOs have to collect for investing in additional capacity.
It is reasonable to assume that this expansion is carried out
in the long-run and the individual cost can, therefore, be split
according to the market share of the MVNO.
Hence, we can assume that each operator will pay an
expenditure Bm equal to :
Bm,s = Cm,s + Cpre,s ·MSm, ∀m ∈M. (8)
It is important to recall that α decreases with an increase
in the number of users as well as an increase in the selected
Qm value. In the game, we can also figure out if MVNOs
– at the equilibrium – are willing to invest in expanding the
infrastructure or not.
2) Reward function: In our framework, we model user
behavior by evaluating an acceptance probability function that
matches the utility received and the price submitted into a
satisfaction function for the users. Actually, for introducing the
investment incentive for MVNOs, we need to define a more
complex reward function, that allows the operators to estimate
the advantages or disadvantages of additional investments. For




p ·A (p, Uk,s) + Fk,s (p) , (9)
contains two terms representing two payment criteria:
i) pA (p, Uk,s) describing a major part of the price accord-
ing to the achieved utility, in order to measure the actual
satisfaction of the user, where the “optimal” price p is
evaluated as the one maximizing the total profit;
ii) Fk,s (p) denoting an extra component, that varies accord-
ing to the quality target promised by the MVNO.
The term in i) is the reference acceptance probability presented
in Section II, so we investigate the term in ii) given by
Fk,s (p) = Qm · δ · p ·A (p+Qmδp, UthQm) . (10)
We assume that MVNOs can charge the users an extra fee
that depends on the quality target they promise to deliver to
the users. We consider the extra fee to be equal to the product
of a percentage δ of the fixed price p and the quality factor
Qm selected. Then, we estimate the willingness of users to
pay this cost (p + Qmδp) according to the promised utility
(UthQm).
Equation (10) plays a slightly different role based on the
two following cases:
1) If the resources available in the network are sufficient to
achieve the MVNO’s threshold (α = 1), this term is a
way to incentivize MVNOs to push for higher quality for
users (short-term investment);
2) If the InP cannot fulfill the requests of the MVNOs (i.e,
α < 1), the MVNOs need to estimate a potential return
on investment for addressing a capacity expansion cost
defined earlier (long-term investment).
We characterize the solution of the game by introducing the
Nash Equilibrium (NE) in pure strategies [17].
C. Applied algorithm
The formulation described so far points out different goals
for the agents involved in this scenario. On one hand, the
InP optimizes the resources to allocate by maximizing the
proportional fairness parameter α based on the MVNOs’ target
utility. On the other hand, the MVNOs try to maximize their
profit by analyzing the user satisfaction for any given strategy.
Given this contraposition, we decouple the two objective
functions (i.e., those solved by InP and the MVNOs) and
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Fig. 1: Two stage optimization problem.
allows us to avoid non-linearities in the formulation, i.e. in
(4d), and in the evaluation of the pressure cost. We solve
|S| independent optimization problems, where |S| denotes
the cardinality of the set of the strategies S. We consider
all possible permutations of strategies s as instances of the
resource allocation problem and for each of these, we evaluate
the cost function described in (8), the reward function in (9),
and, lastly, the strategy dependent profit function defined in
(5). Finally, we solve an optimization problem to find a NE of
the game that, while optimizing the selection of the price p,
maximizes the profit for each MVNO m. The existence of an
equilibrium has not been proven in this framework; however,
we always get a feasible solution, resulting, at least, in one
equilibrium point.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we analyze the MVNOs’ strategies at the
equilibrium and compare the results at the equilibrium with
other strategies (not NE) maximizing the overall profit func-
tion.
A. Simulation setup
We consider the single base station scenario described in
Section II and model the competition among three MVNOs,
i.e. |M | = 3. We also assume all the MVNOs have the same
number of users and they have the same market share, i.e.
MSm = 0.33. The users are uniformly distributed throughout
the coverage area of the base station and they are simultane-
ously active in each time slot of the window of observation of
length N = 200 time slots, where each time slot is of duration
1 ms.
We model the wireless channel by a frequency-flat block
fading channel with i.i.d. Rayleigh coefficients – resulting
in exponentially distributed random channel gains |hk[n]|2.
Then, we assume that the power received by a generic user is
calculated through the Okumura-Hata model, indicating by P
the base station transmitted power (in Watts [W]), and by β the
TABLE I: The applied parameters and their values.
Parameter Definition Value
Ccap CapEx Cost 20
Cop OpEx Cost 20
Uth User expected utility 0.5 Mbps/Hz
δ Portion of extra price 0.1
λ InP return on investment 1.5
p Tariff/month [0.3, 0.6, . . . , 30]
|M | Number of MVNOs 3
MSm Market Share 0.33
N Duration of simulation 200 ms
path-loss exponent. Hence, the average Signal-to-Interference-






where dk is the user’s distance from the base station (in meters
[m]), σ2 is the thermal noise, I0 is the average interference
power of the neighboring base stations.
Due to the fast fading components, the instantaneous SINR
at time slot n is equal to
γk[n] = |hk[n]|2 · SINRk, (12)
which leads to the evaluation of the spectral efficiency of a
user k (in bit/s/Hz) at any time instance n as
rk[n] = log2(1 + γk[n]). (13)
The utility targets are defined in terms of spectral efficiency;
hence, we design the utility achieved, Uk, as a linear function
of the assigned resources and the maximum achievable rate:
Uk (xk[n], rk[n]) = xk[n] · rk[n]. (14)
It is important to note that all the costs as well as the pricing
tariffs are to be considered purely illustrative (see Table I).
They are used for the sole purposes of understanding the key
characteristic behavior of the model.
B. Results
We consider two different user densities: first, we analyze
the strategies played at the equilibrium when the number of
users per MVNO Km = 4, and then, when Km = 15. We
observed that in both cases the NE strategy selected by the
MVNOs is the one that maximizes the quality of service
delivered to their users, denoted by the triple (1, 1, 1). The
symmetry of the NE strategy comes also from the symmetry
in MS.
In Fig. 2, we compare the costs incurred and the profits of
individual MVNOs both when the InP can and cannot fulfill
the MVNOs’ requirements. In Fig. 2(a), the resources available
in the network are sufficient to satisfy the target utility of
the MVNOs as indicated by the zero-values of the pressure
cost. This condition justifies the selection based on maximum
quality, i.e. based on users being completely satisfied, and the
MVNOs can, therefore, maximize their profit by selecting the





























(b) 15 users per MVNO
Fig. 2: Costs and profit of each MVNO at the equilibrium
strategy for different densities.
However, when the total number of users in the cell is in-
creased, the resources are insufficient to meet the target utility.
So unlike the previous case, we see an increase in the pressure
cost (Fig. 2(b)), which is shared equally among the MVNOs
owing to the symmetry of the problem. A consequence of
resource scarcity is the decrease in the average utility of the
users, Uk; this compels MVNOs to adjust the price, as shown
in Fig. 3(b), in order to maximize profit2.
As shown in Fig. 4, the MVNOs could obtain higher profits
by selecting a different set of strategies, which do not result in
a NE such as the triple (0.4, 0.4, 0.4). But, since the pressure
cost is proportional to the market share and not the chosen
quality (cf. (8)), each MVNO tries to get an advantage of
this scenario, trying to maximize profit by selecting higher
quality levels for its users. Hence, as result of the competitive
structure, the MVNOs reach an equilibrium point by deciding
to jointly invest in the network expansion.
Fig. 5 shows how the NE strategy and future investment
(i.e., pressure cost) vary while increasing the number of users
per MVNO. We observe that there exists a point (approxi-
mately at 40 users per MVNO) where the model is unable to
sufficiently incentivize additional investments and this leads
2The increase in the profit is due to the assumption made on the selected
parameter. The absolute values of the profit are not investigated in this work.
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(a) 4 users per MVNO
Price for user

























(b) 15 users per MVNO
Fig. 3: Selected optimal price: the slope of the curves changes
according to the utility achieved. The optimal price is indicated
by the cross intercepting the curve.
the MVNOs to select a NE strategy different from (1, 1, 1).
In other words, the resources available in the network are
so scarce that additional investments are unwarranted. This
implies that there exists a minimum amount of resources
that the InP needs to provide such that the MVNOs can be
incentivized to invest in the infrastructure. Further insights
are given by the Price of Stability (PoS), defined as the
ratio between the profit earned at the NE and the strategy
maximizing the individual profit [18]. We observe that the PoS
decreases while the number of users increases, which means
that the profit for the MVNOs at the equilibrium strategy
decreases w.r.t. the optimal one. However, when the MVNOs
decide to reduce their investment, the PoS starts increasing
again.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an approach to analyze the
engagement of multiple MVNOs in a sharing infrastructure
scenario. This work enables competition introducing a differ-
entiation criterion among the MVNOs that are free to select
the level of quality of service that they want to deliver to
their users. MVNOs can estimate the economical advantages
of the decision, balancing the costs addressed to the usage










Fig. 4: Costs and profit at non-equilibrium strategy for Km =
15. MVNOs could maximize the profit selecting the triple
(0.4, 0.4, 0.4).
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Fig. 5: Nash equilibria increasing user densities.
This framework also evaluates the willingness of the MVNOs
to invest in the shared infrastructure. Assuming scarcity of
resources, the competition scenario leads the MVNOs to push
in the investment, although it does not represent the strategy
that maximizes profit. This model also finds a limit point, in
which the amount of extra resources needed is too costly to
justify an investment. This may lead to the evaluation of a
more complex business ecosystem wherein the competition
among different InPs could find out a way to incentivize also
InPs in the investment in order to meet user requirements.
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